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Consciousness has been proposed to play a key role in shaping ﬂexible learning and as such
is thought to confer an evolutionary advantage. Attention and awareness are the perhaps
most important underlying processes, yet their precise relationship is presently unclear.
Both of these processes must, however, serve the evolutionary imperatives of survival
and procreation. They are thus intimately bound by reward and emotion to help to priori-
tize efﬁcient brain resource allocation in order to predict and optimize behavior. Here we
show how this process is served by a paralimbic network consisting primarily of regions
located on the midline of the human brain. Using many different techniques, experiments
have demonstrated that this network is effective and speciﬁc for self-awareness and con-
tributes to the sense of unity of consciousness by acting as a common neural path for
a wide variety of conscious experiences. Interestingly, hemodynamic activity in the net-
work decreases with focusing on external stimuli, which has led to the idea of a default
mode network.This network is one of many networks that wax and vane as resources are
allocated to accommodate the different cyclical needs of the organism primarily related
to the fundamental pleasures afforded by evolution: food, sex, and conspeciﬁcs. Here we
hypothesize, however, that the paralimbic network serves a crucial role in balancing and
regulating brain resource allocation, and discuss how it can be thought of as a link between
current theories of so-called “default mode,” “resting state networks,” and “global work-
space.” We show how major developmental disorders of self-awareness and self-control
can arise from problems in the paralimbic network as demonstrated here by the example of
Asperger syndrome.We conclude that attention, awareness, and emotion are integrated by
a paralimbic network that helps to efﬁciently allocate brain resources to optimize behavior
and help survival.
Keywords: consciousness, attention, reward, pleasure, cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, precuneus, paralimbic
network
INTRODUCTION
Biological evolution is a complex process allowing species and
organisms to try to resist the second law of thermodynamics. Over
time, this has led to the evolution of increasingly sophisticated
brains allowing organisms to adapt and survive longer by learning
from experience and predicting future events. Yet, this increase in
adaptability also leads to an increasingly difﬁcult resource alloca-
tion problem of how to best select between competing wants and
likes (Kringelbach and Berridge, 2009). Human consciousness can
be thought of as one particular successful solution to this taxing
problem, primarily facilitated by the processes of attention and
awareness.
The scientiﬁc study of human consciousness is growing beyond
its infancy and many interesting properties of its underlying neu-
ronal substrates have been established (Changeux and Lou, 2011).
Yet countless fundamental discoveries remain,however,and inpar-
ticular understanding the precise relationship between attention
and awareness has remained elusive (although this special issue is
beginning to address the issue). In addition to the main tenet of
the present discussion, namely of a bidirectional and intimate rela-
tionship between attention and self-awareness networks, it should
be noted that in particular for the attentional network, there
are asymmetries between hemispheric involvement. For instance,
Mesulam (1999) drew attention to the prime role of the right
hemisphere in generating spatial neglect, and more recently it has
been demonstrated that the functional connectivity of the insula
to the paralimbic network is asymmetrical as well (Cauda et al.,
2011).
One way to conceptualize the relationship between attention
and awareness is to think of attention as an executive function
allowing the focusing of the mind, while awareness is its closely
associated counterpart at the highest level of sensory processing.
Yet, this conceptualization leaves out the importance of reward and
emotion in guiding the crucial decision making involved in opti-
mizing resource allocation of brain resources, which we discuss in
this review.
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Someprogress has beenmade in identifying how self-awareness
can help in shaping the decision making. Interestingly, part of this
progress has been made possible by studying the introspective
states involved in meditation. Studies of highly experienced Yoga-
nidra practitioners have shown that there are signiﬁcantly different
brain networks involved in the states related to relaxation medi-
tation (Yoga-nidra) and normal resting state (i.e., at rest, without
intended motor, or mental function), and that these networks vary
greatly with the changing contents of consciousness during the
two conditions (Lou et al., 1999). In contrast, common to both
states and traits is sustained activity in a paralimbic network con-
sisting of midline frontal regions (anterior cingulate and medial
prefrontal cortices), parietal regions (primarily precuneus), and
striatum (Kjaer and Lou, 2000; see Figures 1 and 2).
This discovery led to thehypothesis that theparalimbicnetwork
contributes to the regulation of conscious experience by acting
as a common reference of self-perspective for changing conscious
states and traits (Kjaer and Lou, 2000). Such a role for the paralim-
bic network would be consistent with ontogenetic considerations
of brain development (Feinberg and Keenan, 2005). Accordingly,
animals with a paleomammalian brain, a brain with developed
limbic system, but scarcely developed neocortex,may display quite
sophisticated social behaviors like maternal nurturing, separation
distress calls, and play, while the adjacent neocortex is essential for
perception of the self in space and time, a prerequisite for abstract
thinking.
The neuroanatomical evidence also supports the hypothesis
that the paralimbic network plays a special role in guiding the
FIGURE 1 | Sketch of the paralimbic network. Principal component
analysis was used to identify brain regions common to conscious
experiences during yoga-nidra meditation and the normal resting conscious
state. Two major clusters were found, explaining 25 and 18% of the
variability. The paralimbic network consists of a set of three regions which
contributed to both clusters: Striatum, medial prefrontal, and medial parietal
cortices (precuneus). Being active in a wide variety of conscious
experiences, we hypothesize that this paralimbic network represented
self-reference, as a common denominator for conscious experiences to
account for a sense of unity of consciousness.
allocation of brain resources by mediating between attention,
awareness, and emotion. The paralimbic regions are anatomically
located at the interface between the limbic and the neocortical
brain, the former providing information on the bodily state and
emotions, while the heteromodal neocortical association regions
provide extrapersonal sensory and mnemotic information on the
highest level of integration available for attention and awareness.
Relying on this broad outline and on anatomical, physiological,
and behavioral experiments in the monkey, Mesulam (1998) pro-
posed that the cerebral cortex is organized into ﬁve hierarchically
arranged subtypes: Limbic, paralimbic, heteromodal association,
unimodal association, and primary sensory motor regions.
In the present review we synthesize the evidence from the lit-
erature to show that the paralimbic network is active and efﬁcient
in self-processing, a prime organizer of conscious experience. We
show how the paralimbic network uses information from both the
external world and introspection to balance the resource alloca-
tion, and how the access and balance in this system is regulated by
emotion and by neurotransmitters such as dopamine. Finally, we
show how disturbances in the paralimbic network may be involved
in developmental disorders such as autism.
Before proceeding, however, a brief note of caution regard-
ing the limits of neuroimaging. As such it is important to realize
that neuroimaging ﬁndings resulting from a comparison of active
and control conditions usually are correlative only and will not
imply causality. Also they will not necessarily uncover the full
network of brain regions involved. Instead, what neuroimaging
may reveal are the changes in activity in the important nodes
and hubs of the human brain which can bring about changes
in the balance of resource allocation between different brain
networks, the associated behavior, and the resulting experience.
In addition, also electromagnetic methods may have important
caveats. One example is the fact that microsaccades may elicit
gamma synchrony in the frontal cortex, while the parietal lobe is
FIGURE 2 | A medial paralimbic network common to conscious
experiences.The ﬁgure shows brain maps of activity related to self and
other (midline, right, and left hemisphere). (A) Emergence of
self-representation. Differential activity is noted in medial paralimbic
regions, together with bilateral occipital and parietal regions (p<0.05,
corrected for multiple comparisons). (B) Emergence of representation of
other (Danish Queen). Differential activity is noted in medial paralimbic
regions, together with bilateral occipital and parietal regions and a conﬂuent
left inferior prefrontal and temporal region. Activity in the paralimbic
network is similar across the two conditions, an indication of the pivotal
role of this network in higher-order consciousness with self-reference. (Lou
et al., 2004, with permission).
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unaffected (Carl et al., 2012). The parietal lobe is a key constituent
of the paralimbic network discussed in this review. Therefore
the gamma synchrony described here cannot be attributed to
eye-movements.
THE PARALIMBIC NETWORK IS EFFECTIVE AND SPECIFIC IN
SELF-PROCESSING
The conscious sense of self serves as a common reference for mak-
ing decisions about the allocation of resources ensuring survival,
whether related to any of the fundamental pleasures of food, sex,
or other people or even higher-order pleasures such as music or
monetary reward. Establishing the functional neuroanatomy of
the self is thus potentially a fruitful strategy for identifying the
hubs and key nodes in the brain networks important for main-
taining the balance between the competing processes of attention,
awareness, and emotion.
One essential role for the self is to be a common reference point
in space and time for conscious experiences (Gallagher, 2000).
Together, they are all experienced in unity, coherent in space and
time. Even when someone enters the room, or the phone rings,
and the scene and our focus of attention shifts completely, we
usually experience the changed scene as continuous with the pre-
ceding (Tononi and Edelman, 1998). To account for this coherence
of widely different conscious percepts, the self offers a possibility:
per deﬁnition,we cannot have free-ﬂoating sensations with no self
to experience them, andwe cannot have a self completely devoid of
sensory experiences, memories, or feelings. In other words: non-
self sensations and memories and the self are two sides of the same
coin.
If each of the different, ever-changing sensations and memories
are attached to the same coherent self-structure across space and
time, these types of information will be bound to each other via
the self. A coherent self across time requires a system to retrieve
memories of personal experiences, i.e., episodic memory. Corre-
lational evidence suggests that this system is involved not only
in retrieval of past personal memories, but also in conceptualiz-
ing the future (Ingvar, 1985;Andreasen et al., 1995). Consequently,
episodicmemory retrieval appears as an indispensable component
of the more complex forms of self-awareness and conscious-
ness, which are described in various terms such as extended self,
meta-consciousness, autonoetic consciousness, or narrative self
(Gallagher, 2000). In a particular amnesic syndrome, transient
global amnesia, a rudimentary sense of self is preserved. This state
is characterized by loss of episodic memory, while working mem-
ory, and semantic memory are relatively spared (Quinette et al.,
2003).
The neural organization of episodic memory retrieval involves
hemodynamically synchronized activity in medial paralimbic
regions including the anterior cingulate and posterior cingulate
cortices and adjacent neocortical structures, as well as in the thal-
amus (Henson et al., 1999; McDermott et al., 1999; Wiggs et al.,
1999; Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000; Gardiner, 2001; Tulving, 2002).
Further hemodynamic studies have conﬁrmed that the paralimbic
network is active in self-awareness (Kjaer et al., 2002b), and single
pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation conﬁrmed the speciﬁcity
and causality of the network in extended self-awareness (Lou et al.,
2004; see Figure 3).
FIGURE 3 | Causality and specificity of one node of the paralimbic
network in self-reference.The ﬁgure demonstrates the effects of applying
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in targeting the
precuneus/posterior cingulate region in a task probing self-reference. The
causality of this region in self-reference is seen by the fact that retrieval of
self-judgment was signiﬁcantly less efﬁcient with TMS at a latency of
160ms than with a latency of 0ms (p=0.003), suggesting that neural
activity at that time interval after stimulus presentation is particularly
important for self-representation. Speciﬁcity of this region in self-reference
is provided by the fact that the difference between self and other (best
friend) is signiﬁcant at most latencies (p<0.05), except at the speciﬁc
causal latency. (Lou et al., 2004, with permission).
In contrast to extended self-awareness, the minimal self is pre-
reﬂexive, immediate, normally infallible, and involves the sense
of ownership of experiences. For the minimal self, data on the
neural organization are scarcer, but indicate that the same para-
limbic structures are active here as well (Vogeley et al., 2004),
being a “common denominator” for the self, independent of its
complexity, and consisting mainly of a network of paralimbic
regions. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have
shown a consistent pattern of activity in self-processing for a par-
alimbic network including anterior cingulate/medial prefrontal
cortices, posterior cingulate/medial parietal cortices (with pre-
cuneus), and pulvinar thalamus (Lou et al., 2004). In addition,
other brain regions including striatum and cerebellum have also
been implicated.
This network of paralimbic regions not only shows corre-
lated activity with self-reference, but has also been shown to be
causally related to self-reference. Transcranial magnetic pulses
(TMS) can transiently disturb the neural function of key regions
in the paralimbic network with decreased efﬁciency speciﬁcally of
self-reference as a result (Lou et al., 2004).
Anatomically, the medial prefrontal/anterior cingulate and
medial parietal/posterior cingulate regions are connected directly
via the cingulum bundle, and indirectly, through their rich con-
nections via the“limbic”and intralaminar thalamic nuclei, located
centrally at the base of the forebrain (Lou et al., 2004).
Each structure in the paralimbic circuitry contributes fun-
damental properties to extended self-awareness (Northoff and
Bermpohl, 2004). The evidence shows that many of the regions on
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the midline of the prefrontal cortex are involved in self-reference.
The medial orbitofrontal cortex at the base of the frontal lobes has
been shown to be a related to evaluating the valence of the conver-
gence of intero- and exteroceptive stimuli, including the remark-
able valence of human infants (Nauta,1971;Kringelbach andRolls,
2004; Kringelbach et al., 2008). This region has been called the
“entrance door to self-awareness” based on EEG and MEG studies
showing comparatively early engagement after onset of emotional
stimuli (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004). Self-referential stimuli
are then monitored in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex in the
sense that stimuli are selected here among competing stimuli for
access to consciousness. The supplementary motor area is closely
functionally related to the anterior cingulate cortex in preparation
for action, in particular when there are no external cues to tell
the subject what to do. Self-referential stimuli are thought to be
evaluated in the dorso-medial prefrontal cortex as judged to be
pertaining to one-self or other persons (Northoff and Bermpohl,
2004). “Theory of the mind,”or attributing mental states to others,
is also associated with activity in the region, which therefore may
constitute a link between introspection and understanding others
(Frith and Frith, 1999).
These frontal monitoring and evaluative functions of self-
awareness are complemented by functions in the posteriormidline
establishing spatial and diachronic unity of self and of conscious-
ness: Spatial organization in a ﬁrst person framework involves pos-
terior cingulate/medial parietal cortex (Northoff and Bermpohl,
2004) which is also active in linking new information with prior
knowledge on the subject matter (Maguire et al., 1999). In auto-
noetic consciousness, the region is active in retrieval of episodic
memory for autobiographical self-consciousness (Cavanna and
Trimble, 2006). The functional integrity of medial parietal cortex
is critical for extended self-awareness. This has been shownbyTMS
targeting precuneus to transiently disrupt the normal function of
this region (Lou et al., 2004). The central role of the intralaminar
nuclei for consciousness is illustrated by the fact that even minute
lesions here may cause loss of consciousness (Schiff, 2008).
THE ROLE OF THE PARALIMBIC NETWORK IN BALANCING
THE DYNAMICS BETWEEN NETWORKS
Neuroimaging experiments support the proposed role of the par-
alimbic network as a central integrator and arbitrator of resource
allocation in the human brain. In particular, in addition to evi-
dence from indirect techniques such as fMRI and PET,more direct
and faster methods such as magnetoencephalography (MEG) have
recently provided very useful information regarding the dynamics
of the underlying physiology.
When sampling data from the most important hubs of the
paralimbic network including the anterior cingulate/medial pre-
frontal and posterior cingulate/medial parietal cortices as well as
thalamic regions, it has been demonstrated that gamma synchrony
is a common neural event in both minimal self-reference and
extended self-reference, where the degree of synchrony is clearly
related to the degree of self-reference (Lou et al., 2010). As noted
above, this mechanism of gamma synchrony is not likely to be
affected by the recent discovery that microsaccades may give rise
to gamma oscillations. These gamma oscillations are induced by
extra cerebral sources primarily in the frontal lobe, and have not
been found in the parietal cortices (Carl et al., 2012). In addition
we used beamforming for source localization which allows a clear
distinction between sources.
The degree of gamma synchrony in the paralimbic network is
a potential mechanism between conscious experiences and widely
different degrees of self-reference. This mechanism of gamma syn-
chrony in the paralimbic network thus meets one of the main
requirements needed to bind conscious experience in the so-called
neuronal global workspace theory (Dehaene et al., 1998) based on
earlier theoretical work (Baars, 1989).
Yet, theories of consciousness abound and while the global
workspace theory has been highly inﬂuential, other potential can-
didate theories exist. An equally important concept developed
over the last decade is the default mode theory (Gusnard and
Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). According to this theory, sen-
sory information arriving from the outside world will lead to a
decrease in perfusion and energy metabolism of the medial default
mode network, in analogy with the re-direction of brain activ-
ity with shifting modalities of sensory stimulation (Lam et al.,
1999).
At ﬁrst glance these two theories would seem contradictory,
with the global workspace theory referring to a single global brain
network processing consciousness, while the default mode the-
ory posits one brain network for processing the outer world, and
another network for the inner world.
The hypothesized paralimbic network offers a solution to this
apparent paradox. The evidence from MEG,which is a direct mea-
sure of brain activity, shows that paralimbic network becomes
synchronized to varying degrees during experiences of both the
outer world with only minimal self-reference, and more so in
introspection during extended self-reference (Lou et al., 2010).
In contrast, we reanalyzed some of our data and found that
the paralimbic network showed a signiﬁcant reduction in gamma
power only during a minimally self-related task (syllable count-
ing, see Figure 4),while therewere no signiﬁcant change in gamma
power during extended self-reference (retrieval of own judgment
on one-self).
Compare this with the evidence from indirect measures of
brain activity such as fMRI which shows that regions involved
in the default mode network have reduced blood oxygenation
level dependent (BOLD) signal during goal directed (non-self-
referential) tasks relative to rest (Raichle et al., 2001). The reduc-
tion in gamma power as measured with MEG during an active
task (syllable counting) could reﬂect the deactivation in the default
mode network during active tasks. Some of the evidence suggests
that changes in gamma power are indeed correlated with BOLD
which is an indirect measure of the synaptic activity (Logothetis
and Wandell, 2004).
In sum, the evidence from MEG studies show that the par-
alimbic network can provide the gamma synchrony needed for
the global coherent workspace of consciousness, while also fulﬁll-
ing the criteria of reduced activity (i.e., changes in gamma power
in minimal self-reference) in the midline paralimbic regions of
self-reference elicited by minimal self-reference.
Yet, general gamma synchrony on its own is not sufﬁcient for
consciousness but would also seem to require ampliﬁcation of
activity within recurrent networks. This is suggested by some
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FIGURE 4 | Changes in gamma power in the paralimbic network may
serve to guide allocation of brain resources.The ﬁgure shows the
changes in gamma power within the paralimbic network in the pre-stimulus
baseline in a task involving autobiographic memory retrieval of previous
personal judgments of visually presented words. A signiﬁcant decrease in
gamma power (p<0.05) was found in minimal self-awareness (syllable
counting: syl), compared to the pre-stimulus control state. This was not the
case in extended self-awareness (retrieval of own previous judgment of
one-self). The ﬁgure is generated from new analysis based on data from the
previous experiment shown in Figure 3 (Lou et al., 2010).
intriguing data gathered over 30 years ago, when (Libet, 1982)
discovered that conscious sensations emerge as a function of
both intensity and duration of electric stimulation of the human
somatosensory cortices. They reported a delay of conscious expe-
rience of approximately 400 ms from onset of a sustained stimulus
at threshold intensity and assumed that this latency reﬂected the
need for maintaining the initial frequency and amplitude for an
extended period of time. This suggests that ampliﬁcation of per-
ceptual processing is required to elicit conscious experience, a
process which in the neuronal global workspace theory is termed
“ignition.” In addition, evidence also indicates that high signal
intensity in cortico-thalamic interaction is essential for emergence
of consciousness. The possible nature of such ampliﬁcation has
been widely discussed in the literature. Several researchers have
speculated that extensive recursive activity to bootstrap neuronal
processing is a general mechanism for stimuli to become available
for consciousness (Tononi and Edelman, 1998).
In spite of this long-standing interest in recurrent neuronal
activity, beyond some demonstrations in primary visual cor-
tices, such activity was only recently demonstrated in higher-
order, modality non-speciﬁc regions using MEG and the so-called
Granger causality analysis, a mathematical method initially devel-
oped to analyze econometric data but now also used to identify
the directionality of ﬂow of information between brain regions
(Granger, 1969).
Autobiographic memory retrieval of previous personal judg-
ments of visually presented words was used to probe the temporal
ﬂow of activity within the paralimbic network (Lou et al., 2011a).
It was demonstrated that the pre-stimulus condition is charac-
terized by causal, recurrent oscillations which are maximal in
the lower gamma range. When retrieving previous judgments of
visually presented adjectives, this activity is dramatically increased
during the stimulus task as ascertained by Granger causality analy-
sis, demonstrating not only recurrent gamma activity in higher-
order, modality non-speciﬁc regions but also how the paralimbic
network serves to allocate brain sources.
CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
DOPAMINE
The paralimbic network described here does not only includemid-
line structures in medial anterior and posterior regions which are
continuously active in different states and traits of consciousness,
but the evidence has also implicated the striatum. It is well-known
that dopaminergic neurotransmission is abundantly present in
the striatum. Therefore interest has recently focused on the pos-
sible role of dopaminergic neurotransmission in the regulation of
conscious experience.
At the system level we now know that conscious experience is
linked to interacting regions of parietal and prefrontal cortices,
which are not only active, but also effective in self-reference (Lou
et al., 2004). However, on the molecular level our knowledge has
until recently merely been suggestive. Functional brain imaging
has established that abnormal conscious experiences in schiz-
ophrenia, like hallucinations and delusions, are associated with
abnormal dopaminergic neurotransmission (Changeux and Lou,
2011). For instance, striatal dopamine transporter availability is
inversely correlated with hallucinations (Schmitt et al., 2006).
Furthermore, clinical evidence indicates that striatal dopamine
might regulate conscious experience. One way to measure con-
scious experience is to approach the problem as one of probability
of signal detection (and subsequent subjective interpretation). Fol-
lowing this approach, conscious experience can be determined
by the setting of a criterion for when the sensory signal-to-noise
ratio warrants sufﬁcient subjective conﬁdence that a stimulus is
present. In schizophrenia, psychotic symptoms could be explained
as a result of setting too liberal a signal-to-noise criterion. This is
thought to be due to abnormally upregulated dopaminergic neu-
rotransmission, an effect of dopamine on the cellular level being
to inﬂuence the signal-to-noise ratio (Lou et al., 2011b).
Furthermore, in the previously mentioned study of Yoga-nidra
meditation it was shown that such meditation is accompanied by
a strong increase in sensory awareness, and that this phenome-
non is linked to dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens in
the ventral striatum, which has been implicated in the paralimbic
network consistently active in different conscious states and traits
(Kjaer et al., 2002a).
We directly examined the effect of increasing dopamine activa-
tion and showed that dopaminergic stimulation with the D1 and
D2 receptor agonist pergolide is effective in increasing conﬁdence
in seeing words, a valid measure of awareness (Lou et al., 2011b).
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These results demonstrate how dopamine can inﬂuence activ-
ity across the various nodes and hubs of the paralimbic net-
work, giving rise to changes in both conscious states and
content.
THE ROLE OF THE PARALIMBIC NETWORK IN LINKING
REWARD, EMOTION, AND SELF-AWARENESS
The evidence presented above supports the hypothesis that the
paralimbic network subserves self-processing in the human brain,
and that speciﬁc changes in synchrony between the nodes and
hubs of this network can regulate the dynamics of widespread
connected brain networks. In addition, the evidence also suggests
that dopamine has a special role in modulating activity in this
network.
The evidence thus supports the overall notion that the para-
limbic network plays a key role in the conscious brain resource
allocation associated with predicting and selecting behaviors that
ensures survival. The fundamental rewards afforded by evolution
to ensure survival are food, sex, and conspeciﬁcs; and the time-
courses of the associated behaviors are cyclical (Kringelbach and
Berridge, 2009). There are distinct wanting, liking, and learning
phases in the reward cycle, which have been shown to have partly
dissociable neural substrates (Kringelbach, 2005).
Over time the human brain has to use attentional mechanisms
to detect potential rewards which, depending on the current state
of the organism, may (or may not) initiate a speciﬁc reward cycle.
For example, after becoming aware of hunger signals, the food
reward cycle is initiated and our attention invariably turns to
ﬁnding potential food rewards.
We propose that the paralimbic network plays a key role in inte-
grating awareness, attention, and emotion processing to optimize
the brain resource allocation. The inputs from the senses such as
vision, auditory, taste, smell, and touch (linked to survival-related
rewards such as food and sex) and their subsequent evaluation
have the potential to temporarily shift the focus of the brain net-
works to allow for efﬁcient processing and control over behaviors
(Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008; Kringelbach et al., 2008). The
paralimbic network helps to ensure that the processing remains
balanced over longer time periods.
Mounting evidence has demonstrated that frontal regions such
as the medial orbitofrontal and the anterior cingulate cortices are
situated anatomically at the crossroad between interacting net-
works of attention, awareness, and emotion as necessary nodes
linking the networks (Tsuchiya and Adolphs, 2007; Kringelbach
et al., 2011). It should, however, be noted that these regions are
heterogenous regions with many sub-regions which have been
implicated in different networks (Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004;
Beckmann et al., 2009).
Direct causal evidence for the interaction has been given by
studies showing that direct electrical stimulation of the anterior
cingulate cortex canhelp to alleviate severe chronic pain in patients
(Kringelbach et al., 2010). Recently, we further demonstrated that
reward can directly impact conscious experience and this inte-
gration is directly reﬂected in the neural activity in the anterior
cingulate cortex as measured by local ﬁeld potentials (Rømer
Thomsen et al., 2011).
In general, emerging evidence shows that perturbations to the
paralimbic networkmaymanifest in anunbalancingof widespread
brainnetwork as seen for example in the anhedonia associatedwith
mental illness (Kringelbach et al., 2011).
CLINICAL CONSEQUENCES OF DEVELOPMENT IMPEDIMENT
OF THE PARALIMBIC NETWORK
Development perturbations to the paralimbic network are not
uncommon (Lou, 2011). Here we will brieﬂy focus on an example
of developmental dysfunction found in the Asperger syndrome
(see Box 1).
Individuals with Asperger syndrome would appear to have
problems with introspection and narrative self-awareness. In par-
ticular they have difﬁculty identifying and reﬂecting on their own
emotional states. They also have peculiar concrete thought pat-
terns and a tendency to focus on external events rather than inner
experiences (Hill et al., 2004).
Given the hypothesis of the paralimbic network presented here,
this failure of subjectivity may be predicted to be linked to dys-
function in the paralimbic loop and medial neocortical structures.
While still scarce, some of the experimental data would seem to
support this link. One neuroimaging study involved higher-order
Box 1 Asperger syndrome.
Autism is a neurodevelopmental disorder of genetic origin, characterized by impaired social interaction and communication as well as repet-
itive behavior and restricted interests. The symptomatology being highly variable, the condition is often referred to as “autism spectrum
disorder.” Asperger syndrome is a subgroup where the affected individuals have normal language development and normal or above normal
IQ, together with the typical social communication impairments, obsessions, and narrow interests, suggesting impaired binding of attention,
awareness, and emotion.
Peter is a young boy 16 years of age. After a normal pregnancy and birth he was delayed in motor development and slightly delayed in
development of language. He did not babble until he suddenly spoke perfectly correct. As a toddler he was always playing with construction
toys and puzzles, but not with other children. At school he is marginalized, having special interests not shared by his classmates. He behaves
oddly in social interaction where he is rigid and clumsy, with a very formal, monotonous language. He is unable to interpret moods or motives
of others. He speaks without restraint about his special interests, in an exalted, gesturing, and noisy way. The psychological investigation
shows that he is of normal intelligence, with high scores in memory of facts, especially meaningless facts, and he is eminent at puzzles
and labyrinths. In contrast, he scores below normal in reasoning and social comprehension, in particular sequential understanding of social
activities. He is unable to generate inclusive terms covering a variety of objects. He is characterized by orienting to details. He is diagnosed
as having Asperger syndrome, a milder variant of autism.
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consciousness based on linguistic information, sentence compre-
hension (Just et al., 2004). In autists compared to normal controls,
higher activitywas seen in theWernicke region,while lower activity
was found in Broca’s region and in the medial paralimbic regions.
This ﬁnding supports the hypothesis that the medial paralimbic
circuitry could be defective in autism. Yet, some caution is needed
given that the autists and the normal control participants were not
compared directly, but only indirectly via a common reference to
a ﬁxation point.
Deﬁciency of the paralimbic loop of self-reference could poten-
tially be explained by the evidence for volume reduction and
reduction in glucose metabolism in the entire cingulate cortex
in autism (Haznedar et al., 2000, 2004). In fact, related deﬁciencies
maybe seen in another disorder of self-awareness andhigher-order
consciousness: schizophrenia (Haznedar et al., 2004).
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVE
There is a clear lesson for consciousness research initially emerg-
ing from studying the brain activity in experienced Yoga-nidra
teachers during meditation but subsequently supported by a
wealth of other experiments: a commonparalimbic network serves
to regulate and balance the dynamic resource allocation needed
to ensure survival. This process is guided by processes linked to
awareness, attention, and emotion in order to support memory-
dependent self-reference, which in narrative self-consciousness is
extended into adjacent neocortical regions. Dire clinical conse-
quences are linked to its impediment in pathological conditions.
Yet, as a common reference of conscious experiences, it provides
us with an adaptive tool for building a uniﬁed self and personal-
ity over the years by successfully balancing the allocation of brain
resources for survival and procreation.
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